Regulated Access to Infrastructure in China

How access to infrastructure in China is regulated

Access to infrastructure in China means the right of a third party, such as a gas trader, an independent power producer, a telecoms reseller or a logistics operator, to use a network or facility owned by someone else on reasonable terms. Two bodies of rules apply. The first is sector regulation: laws and departmental rules that oblige operators of pipelines, grids, terminals and similar assets to open capacity to qualified users without discrimination, under the supervision of a sector regulator such as the National Energy Administration (NEA) or the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.

The second is competition law. Under the Anti-Monopoly Law, as amended with effect from 1 August 2022, a dominant undertaking that refuses to deal without a legitimate reason may be committing an abuse, and the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) and its provincial bureaux can investigate.

The two regimes are complementary rather than alternative. A sector rule may set tariffs, capacity procedures and disclosure duties in detail, while competition law polices conduct that falls outside or between those rules, such as tying, discriminatory terms or refusing access to a facility that no sector rule yet covers. For users, the practical question is which route offers the fastest and most credible remedy; for owners and investors, it is how to run an asset so that neither route is triggered.

Essential facilities under the Anti-Monopoly Law

SAMR's Provisions on the Prohibition of Abuse of Dominant Market Positions (SAMR Order No. 66, effective 15 April 2023) expressly list, among forms of refusal to deal, refusing to allow a counterparty to use an essential facility on reasonable terms. When deciding whether a facility is essential, the authority considers, in summary:

• whether it is feasible to build or develop a comparable facility with reasonable investment;
• how far the counterparty depends on the facility to carry on its business effectively;
• whether the dominant undertaking is able to provide access; and
• the effect that providing access would have on the undertaking's own operations.

The same provisions confirm that dominant undertakings may not use data, algorithms, technology or platform rules to carry out the listed abuses, which brings digital gateways within the same logic as physical networks. The Anti-Monopoly Law also contains a specific provision for industries controlled by the state-owned economy that bear on the national economy or national security: the state protects lawful operations in those sectors but also supervises their conduct and pricing, and operators may not use their control or exclusive position to harm consumers.

The essential facilities analysis only starts once dominance is established, so a complainant must first define the relevant market and show the operator's position in it. For a single pipeline or terminal serving a region, that is often straightforward; for logistics hubs, data centres or platforms, market definition is usually the main battleground. Under the amended law, abuse of dominance can lead to an order to stop, confiscation of illegal gains and a fine of between 1% and 10% of the previous year's sales. For a fuller treatment of dominance cases see our page on abuse of dominance.

Sector rules on access to infrastructure in China

The Measures for the Supervision of Fair and Open Access to Oil and Gas Pipeline Network Facilities (NDRC Order No. 33), issued under the Energy Law and effective 1 November 2025, are now the most detailed access code. Operators must serve qualified users fairly and may not refuse service where they have spare capacity; transmission, storage and regasification must be separated financially from sales; capacity allocation rules must be published; and contracts may not contain unfair terms. Unused contracted capacity is treated as released, and users that hoard capacity or provide false information also face penalties. Urban gas distribution networks are outside the scope of these measures.

Key mechanics of the pipeline measures

Similar principles apply elsewhere, although the level of detail varies:

In September 2026 the NEA published separate measures on information disclosure and reporting for pipeline fair access, applying from 1 January 2027, which divide information into categories published to the public, released to registered users and reported to the regulator. Users should expect more granular capacity data from 2027, and operators should be building the systems to produce it now.

Power, telecoms and digital gateways

Outside oil and gas, access to infrastructure in China is governed by less detailed rules. In power, grid companies must connect qualifying generators, including renewables and storage, under connection standards and approved transmission and distribution tariffs, with the NEA and its regional offices supervising fair dispatch and access. Disputes typically concern connection timing, the cost of grid reinforcement and curtailment. Developers should treat grid connection as a critical path item in project documents and financing, not a formality.

In telecoms, the basic carriers own the core networks and interconnection is regulated by MIIT. Foreign participation in value-added telecoms services is shaped by licensing and the foreign investment negative list, so access questions are often bound up with whether the business can be licensed at all. For digital gateways such as app stores, payment systems and large platforms, SAMR's provisions on data, algorithms and platform rules mean that refusing interoperability or applying discriminatory terms can be examined in the same way as a physical bottleneck. This makes access to infrastructure in China a live issue for technology businesses as well as energy companies.

Common access disputes and enforcement

Access problems tend to fall into recurring patterns: an operator claims there is no capacity; it offers access only with conditions such as buying its own gas, equipment or installation services; it charges different users different rates for equivalent service; or it delays signing contracts until the user's commercial window has passed. Local utility tying, where a gas or water supplier requires customers to use designated contractors for connection works, has been a frequent subject of provincial market regulation enforcement.

Remedies differ by route. A complaint to the sector regulator may lead to an order to provide service and administrative penalties under the access rules. A complaint to SAMR may lead to an Anti-Monopoly Law investigation, commitments or fines. A civil claim before a PRC court is also possible under the Anti-Monopoly Law, and under the pipeline measures parties may ask a provincial-level energy authority to mediate or go to court. Which route works best depends on evidence, timing and the commercial relationship. Our page on private antitrust litigation explains the court route.

Choosing a route

A worked example

Consider a foreign-invested gas trader that wants to bring LNG cargoes into a coastal terminal and move gas inland. The illustrative sequence would be: register as a user under the terminal and pipeline operators' published conditions; apply for terminal window and pipeline capacity; if the reply is a refusal, request written reasons and the capacity information users are entitled to receive; compare the reasons with the published allocation rules; then decide, with PRC counsel, whether to seek coordination by the energy authority, complain to the market regulator or negotiate.

Throughout, the trader should keep its own licences and any negative list conditions for its activity in order, because a defective user position weakens any complaint.

Access to infrastructure in China: points for operators and investors

For owners of networks, access obligations are a compliance and valuation issue. Investors in pipelines, storage, terminals, data centres or logistics hubs should test during due diligence whether the asset is subject to an access code, how tariffs are set, and whether any affiliated trading business benefits from the asset in ways that could be challenged as discriminatory. Operators should publish compliant access rules, apply them consistently, keep capacity calculations auditable and document the reasons for any refusal.

Operator compliance checklist

• Published registration conditions, application procedures and capacity allocation rules that match actual practice.
• Financial separation between network services and any affiliated trading or sales business.
• A response log showing dates, decisions and written reasons for each application.
• Auditable capacity calculations and a process for releasing unused capacity.
• Standard contracts reviewed for unfair or discriminatory terms.
• Systems ready for the more detailed disclosure and reporting that applies from 2027.

Transaction documents should reflect the same analysis. Share purchase agreements for regulated assets benefit from warranties on access-code compliance, complaints and penalties, and joint venture agreements should state how capacity will be offered to shareholders and third parties so that preferential treatment of a shareholder-trader does not become a discrimination complaint after closing.

Where a project also involves public bodies, the fair competition review regime may constrain exclusive rights or preferential terms that local governments can grant. Related sector issues are covered on our oil, gas and petrochemicals and power and electricity pages.

International comparison: EU, US, Hong Kong and ASEAN

Foreign participants often come with expectations shaped at home, and it helps to see where access to infrastructure in China resembles other systems. In the EU, regulated third-party access to gas and electricity networks is built into the energy market legislation, with unbundling of network and supply activities, and competition law recognises a narrow essential facilities doctrine. The Digital Markets Act adds specific access and interoperability duties for designated gatekeepers.

In the US, refusal-to-deal claims under the Sherman Act face a demanding standard after the Supreme Court's 2004 Trinko decision, so access is mainly secured through sector regulation such as federal open-access rules for interstate pipelines and transmission. Hong Kong's Competition Ordinance prohibits abuse of a substantial degree of market power, and several ASEAN states run regulated access regimes for telecoms and energy.

China's approach sits between these models: detailed sector codes for oil and gas, broader principles for power and telecoms, and an Anti-Monopoly Law that names essential facilities expressly. For cross-border investors, the lesson is to treat access to infrastructure in China as a combination of a regulatory licence condition and a competition risk, and to model both when valuing an asset or planning market entry.

How TRW & Co helps

Our Shenzhen representative office advises international and Chinese clients on the cross-border and commercial side of infrastructure access. We help users and investors map the applicable access and competition rules as part of the Chinese legal environment, structure capacity and service arrangements, negotiate access, offtake and joint venture documents, and benchmark Chinese regimes against those in other jurisdictions where the client operates.

We prepare strategy for complaints and negotiations, manage evidence and timelines, and advise on the laws of jurisdictions where our lawyers are qualified. Where PRC legal opinions, regulatory complaints, filings or court proceedings are needed, we work alongside licensed PRC law firms and coordinate the overall workstream. Contact us to discuss an access issue.